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Abstract
In a fault tolerant control (FTC) system, a parameter varying FTC law is reconfigured based on fault parameters
estimated by fault detection and isolation (FDI) modules. FDI modules require some time to detect fault occurrences
in aero-vehicle dynamics. In this paper, an FTC analysis framework is provided to calculate the upper bound of an
induced-
 
norm of an FTC system with existence of false identification and detection time delay. The upper bound
is written as a function of a fault detection time and exponential decay rates and has been used to determine which
FTC law produces less performance degradation (tracking error) due to false identification. The analysis framework
is applied for an FTC system of a HiMAT (Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology) vehicle.
Index Terms
fault tolerant control system, linear parameter varying system, HiMAT vehicle.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, there has been interest in a fault tolerant control (FTC) system which has the ability to detect
actuator/sensor faults automatically and to prevent faults from developing into a total system failure. Especially in
designing a flight control system, an active FTC system has been researched for achieving single aircraft accident
prevention [1]–[4]. An active FTC system consists of an FTC law, a fault detection and isolation (FDI) module
and a supervisory system. An FTC law should react to actuator/sensor faults through reconfiguration and an FDI
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2module should detect actuator/sensor fault occurrences. Based on the information provided by an FDI module, a
supervisory system decides which actuator/sensor is faulty and sends a signal to an FTC law for reconfiguration.
In general, an active FTC law is designed, based on an open-loop system modeled as a function of fault
parameters under the assumption that they are immediately identified by an FDI module. Recently, using linear
matrix inequality (LMI) optimization solutions [2]–[4], an active FTC law is synthesized in the form of a linear
parameter varying (LPV) system whose dynamics vary as scheduling parameters change. Open-loop dynamics are
modeled as an LPV system in which scheduling parameters are fault parameters that represent fault occurrences at
actuators/sensors. An LPV-FTC law designed based on the open-loop system can robustly stabilize a closed-loop
system and achieve desired performance during a fault occurrence under the assumption that fault parameters are
measured in real-time.
Typically, there is always some level of time-delay to detect faults regardless of FDI algorithms such as an
extended Kalman FDI filter [4] or an LPV-FDI filter in which a fault detection signal is calculated based on
residual signal [5]. During a time-delay interval, an open-loop system is in a faulty condition but the information
provided by an FDI module implies that the system is in a healthy condition. It is also possible that during a
time interval an FDI module and a supervisory system may produce false identification on healthy actuator/sensors,
which may lead the system to be unstable at the moment.
Since an FDI module and an FTC law are individually designed, without considering the other dynamics [3],
[4], it is required to analyze a whole FTC system including both an FTC law and an FDI module, before they are
implemented into a real system. A typical way of analyzing an FTC system is full nonlinear simulation with the pre-
defined command inputs (not all possible command inputs), for possible fault scenarios. After detailed simulations,
an FTC system may be validated for possible fault scenarios with expensive computational costs. There should
be an alternative analysis method to detailed simulations to provide a certain criteria related with characteristics
of an FDI module such as time-delay and possible false identification. In this paper, an FTC analysis framework
is suggested to describe performance degradation in terms of induced   norm of a system due to possible false
identification and time delay in fault detection. Its upper bound is calculated by using LMI optimization and can be
used to determine which FTC law has less worst-case performance degradation due to possible false identification
and possible time delay without detailed simulations. In this paper, it is demonstrated by applying the FTC analysis
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This paper contains the following sections. In section 2, an FTC system analysis problem is stated and an analysis
methodology is described in section 3. In section 4, a HiMAT FTC system analysis is demonstrated. In section 5,
this paper is concluded with a brief summary.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To describe analysis problems on an FTC system, the general structure of an FTC system is briefly described
here. As shown in Figure 1, an FTC system consists of an FTC law, an FDI module and a supervisory system
(logics). When a fault occurs, the FDI module and supervisory system (logics) detect it and generate signals
for evaluating/reconfiguring the FTC law. The FTC law is designed as an LPV system whose dynamics vary as
scheduling parameters change [4], [6], [7]. The stability and performance level of a closed-loop system may change
when a fault occurs, since the FDI model requires some time to detect fault. Hereafter, the required time is called
detection time for an FDI module. During detection time, open-loop dynamics are in a faulty condition but the
designed control law is not reconfigured yet for it. It implies that there exists a moment when the closed-loop
system is not in the predicted closed-loop dynamics set used in the LPV control synthesis procedure.
In an FTC analysis framework, a closed-loop system is modeled as functions of fault parameters  
	
and estimated fault parameters  	  by an FDI module and a supervisory system since open-loop dynamics

  are dependent on actual fault parameters and the control law   must use the estimates. The closed-loop
system can be written as:
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 %  &'
( ﬁ*)
 %   
ﬀ"!,+
   -.&%
(1)
where states ﬀ /	021 , disturbances &/	023 and errors ( 4	025 . Note that fault parameters and estimated fault
parameters are treated as parameters independent of each other in a closed-loop system to capture the dynamic
variations due to possible false identification. Using a robust LPV control synthesis methodology in Refs. [4], [8]
a control law $   is designed to robustly stabilize open-loop dynamic variations   7698;:< with   satisfying the
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where 8 : is an estimation error bound. Note that the condition is not valid during the detection time.
The entire parameter space of a closed-loop system is defined as
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where  : and : are bounded compact sets in ﬀ  and can be divided into subspaces ﬁ such that
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For example, let’s define a subspace =! as >!  ﬁ    ><  

  8 :<? . When parameter trajectories     
stay in

!
, it implies that the closed-loop system should be stable because the controller is designed for that. During
detection time, the condition (2) is not satisfied generally. In that case, parameter subspaces  @$7$$ 
ﬂ
can be defined
by a reader based on dynamic changes in the closed-loop system. Without loss of generality, a subspace

ﬂ
is
defined as the set of parameter trajectories   "   when the closed-loop system is locally unstable along the
trajectories.
Definition 1 Local stability
Suppose all matrices ﬂ     at fixed   and   in a subspace  ﬁ are stable. Then the system is called locally stable
in the subspace &ﬁ .
To represent dynamic variations of the system in Eq (1) over each parameter subspace, a duration time over
each subspace is defined as follows [9]:
Definition 2 Duration time ACBED over each parameter subspace :
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A duration time is bounded as
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where  
ﬁ

4 and 0AIG9D . The constant  ﬁ represents a ratio of the duration time in the , -th subspace to the
total time and AIG9D is the duration time for a system to stay in the , -th subspace during the interval 	 - 6G
 . Note
that 
ﬂ
ﬁ "!
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ﬁ
ﬁ34 and 
ﬂ
ﬁ "!
A
G
D
ﬁ

G .
Consider the case that the system is assumed to be locally unstable in the 8 -th subspace. The constant 
ﬂ
4
plays an important role in stability analysis used to find an asymptotic stability ratio [9], which is related to stability
margin of the system.
III. ANALYSIS METHOD
A. Stability analysis
Suppose a system in Eq. (1) is locally stable in the set of ﬂ
!

ﬁ "!

ﬁ
and locally unstable in the parameter subspace

ﬂ
.
Proposition 1 [9]: Suppose there exists a positive definite matrix     such that
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where
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The system in Eq. (1) is exponentially stable with a decay rate:
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Proof: Set a Lyapunov function as  ﬁ ﬀ      ﬀ  ,    
	 1  1 . Using Eq. (8), the time derivative of
the Lyapunov function is
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From Eq. (12),
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Taking the upper bound of the duration time over each parameter subspace, Eq. (13) is rewritten as:
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Without loss of generality, the constant 
!
can be set as  &%('C  ﬁ 9, 1T
  8: . Thus, the term  ! 
  ﬁ is always
positive over the parameter subspaces
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When the condition in Eq. (11) is satisfied, it can be easily shown that the system is exponentially stable.
In the FTC system analysis, the constant 
L
can be interpreted as tolerance of instability during a detection time
interval. For example, 
L
ﬁ
=;
4 implies that the closed-loop system can stay in the parameter subspace 
ﬂ
for at
most 10 * of the total interest time without loss of exponential stability. Given fault tolerant control laws, we can
analyze stability of the closed-loop system in terms of a constant 
L
value. The stability analysis problem can be
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The optimization is solved by checking feasibility of the LMI constraints of Eq. (8) using the LMI Toolbox [11]
and line searching over  ﬁ and  values.
B. Performance analysis
For a closed-loop system of Eq. (1), an induced-   norm is defined as:
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In this paper, the performance level of an FTC system with false identification and detection time delay is calculated
in terms of the induced-    norm as follows:
Proposition 2: Suppose there exists a positive definite matrix     	  1  1 such that
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The induced-    norm from & to ( of the closed-loop system is no larger than #%$ where
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Using Eq. (22),  is rewritten as:
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Since   U- S   G  , the following inequality is extracted from Eq. (23):
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Using Eq. (7) and the definition of  in Eq. (21), it is derived that
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Integrating both sides of Eq. (25) over the interval [  G<	 ) leads to
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Thus, the upper bound # $ of the induced-    norm is
# $
ﬁ ﬂ

(



Dﬀ

(



D


N
D ﬁ

(
ﬁ ﬂ

N


!

; (27)
DRAFT
9The constant # $ represents the upper bound of the worst-case performance level due to false identification and the
time delay. Thus, the performance analysis problem is formulated into an optimization problem:
 ﬀ


D
  ﬂ 
$
    
# $  s.t. Eq.(19) ; (28)
The optimization problem Eq.(28) is solved by line searching over pre-defined  ﬁ and  ranges and using the
LMI Toolbox [11]. First, feasible ranges of  ﬁ and  are chosen based on few test run results. Second, the minimum
value of ﬂ is calculated using the LMI Toolbox [11] at fixed  ﬁ and  values with the constraint Eq. (19). Third, an
upper bound # $ is calculated with given time delay values A G D and steps 2 and 3 are repeated to find the minimum
value of #&$ over the pre-defined  ﬁ and  ranges.
IV. EXAMPLE
A. HiMAT FTC System
The HiMAT FTC system taken from Ref. [4] is briefly described here before applying the analysis framework
suggested in section 3. The model has two inputs  : elevons 8
*
and canards 8 ; two outputs  : angle of attack 
in radians and pitch angle  in radians; and four states ﬀ : velocity  in ft/sec, angle of attack  , pitch rate  in
rad/sec, and pitch angle  . The LPV model of the HiMAT vehicle [4] is
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 8 < 
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where the detailed elements of the system matrices ﬂ , # , and ) are in Ref. [4]. It is noticed from Eq. (29) that
faults on the actuators are modeled as control sensitivity variations (a function of fault parameters 	 ! and 	  ) under
the assumption that estimation error bound is 0.1. Consider a failure case that one actuator is failed at a time to
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keep controllability of the open-loop system non-zero. To represent one fault at a time, the scheduling parameter
of the LPV model is chosen as   such that
  

4
 
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4

	

ﬁ4 Elevon failure
 
ﬁ4

	
!
ﬁ4

	

ﬁ4
4

  K5 
	
!
ﬁ4
 
	


4 Canard failure ;
(31)
For the detailed fault models, the reader is referred to Ref. [4].
The on-line FDI module and FTC control laws are taken from Ref. [4] and are very briefly described here. The
fault parameters 	
!
and 	  are estimated by the on-line FDI module designed using a two-stage extended Kalman
filter [4], [12]. Using the same logics in Eq. (31), the estimated scheduling parameter   is calculated from estimated
fault parameters 	
!
and 	  . The LPV-FTC laws   and  are designed using the conventional LPV control
synthesis [7] and the robust LPV control synthesis [4], respectively. In the conventional LPV synthesis method, it
is assumed that scheduling parameters are exactly measured. In the robust LPV synthesis method [4] scheduling
parameters can be estimated within a given estimation error bound. In the control synthesis process, the design
objective is to reduce pitch angle command tracking error for both controllers. Note that false identification and
estimate time-delay are not considered in the control synthesis procedure.
In this example, it will be determined which controller can generate less pitch angle command tracking error due
to false identification without detailed simulations. In this model, false identification cases can be 1) canard failure
indicated by the FDI module for actual elevator failure or 2) elevator failure indicated for actual canard failure for
a short time interval. Here only the first case of false identification is be analyzed because it can severely affect the
closed-loop dynamics. Note that the closed-loop system is locally unstable for the first case but not for the second
case.
To analyze the false identification (   ﬁ 5 and    ), the parameter set  is divided into three subspaces such
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(32)
The parameter subspaces are determined based on the dynamic variations of the closed-loop system. More specif-
ically, the subspace >! is set because the LPV control law is designed for the predicted closed-loop dynamics in
the subspace >! [4]. The subspace   is set because the closed-loop system is locally stable but the closed-loop
dynamics set in the subspace   is not considered in the control synthesis procedure. The subspace  is set for
the false identification case in which the closed-loop system is locally unstable in  .
B. Stability analysis on the HiMAT FTC system
In this subsection, stability of the HiMAT FTC system is analyzed for the false identification that leads to
the closed-loop system being locally unstable. The LMI constraints in Eq. (8) are evaluated at grid points   

'9(;
4
9=; 57$$7$' 5 over the parameter subspaces defined in Eq. (32). To solve the optimization problem in Eq. (17),
the ranges of 
!
,   , and  are defined as =;  4  ! K(; 4 , =;  4   =; 4 , and 2 4  , respectively. With
fixed  ! ,   , and  values in each range, the feasibility of the LMI constraints is checked with a constant matrix

and a parameter dependent matrix

  for reducing conservatism in LMI solution [7], respectively. To use a
parameter dependent matrix     , the time derivative

  is required to determine


ﬁ

 



:


:
. In this example, the
basis functions for     and the bound of time derivative

  are taken from Ref. [4]. Note that it is still unknown
how to choose optimal basis functions in LPV control synthesis.
The calculated 
L
values are  4 


for the control   and 	
 4 


for the control  using

or

  .
There is not much difference using between constant

and

  in stability analysis results. It is noticed from
the analysis results that the closed-loop system can be stable if the false identification occurs every 100 Q ( time
with duration 0.5 Q ( . Both controllers have similar effects on closed-loop stability due to the false identification.
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TABLE I
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS RESULTS
constant matrix

Controller  !    ﬂ
     
4



4

4



9.4 0.42
  
4



4

4



5.85 2.14
parameter dependent

 -
Controller  !    ﬂ

 

4



4

4



9.4 0.34



4



4

4



3.7 0.63
C. Performance analysis on the HiMAT FTC system
In this section, the upper bound of the induced-   norm from pitch angle command to tracking error of the
FTC system is calculated due to the false identification. Using line searching over the  ! ,   , and  ranges, the
analysis results are shown in Table I. Using the analysis results in Table I for each controller, the # $ variations are
calculated due to false identification time A?G variations using Eq. (27) and are shown in Figure 2. Note that the
duration time A G  is set as 0.2 sec here. Since  ! and   are similar values, the time A G  does not affect much the
upper bound # $ . It is observed from Figure 2 that performance analysis results are significantly different using a
constant matrix

and a parameter dependent matrix     . Recall that using a parameter dependent matrix   
can reduce conservatism in results of LMI [7]. It is easily noticed from Figure 2 that when a false identification
time is short ( A G 

(; 55 Q
(  ), the # $ with the    control law is less than that with the   control law. When
the time is long ( A GU3=; 5 5Q ( ), the # $ values are vice versa. The analysis results imply that the    control
law leads to less tracking error when A"G

=; 5 5 Q
( and the   control law leads to less tracking error when
AIGU3(; 55 Q
(
. To validate the FTC system performance analysis results, the closed-loop system with a step
pitch angle command at 1 Q ( is simulated with assumption of false identification detection time AG ﬁ (; 4 , 0.2, 0.4
and 0.8 Q (  for each control law. In each simulation, canards are failed at 1 Q ( . The tracking error time histories
are plotted in Figure 3 for each case. Obviously noticeable is that the error norm of  
  
ﬂ

  with the   
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control law is larger than that with the   control law at the AIG ﬁ =;   and 0.8 Q ( cases. Also, the error norm
with the  control law is larger than that with the    control law at the A G ﬁ =; 4 and 0.2 Q (  cases. It shows
that the parameter dependent analysis results in Figure 2 correspond to the simulation results in Figure 3.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the FTC system analysis problem is formulated into an optimization problem with LMI constraints
which are evaluated at grid points over the stable/unstable parameter subspaces. From the stability analysis, the
stability margin of an FTC system can be calculated for possible false identification when a fault occurs. From the
performance analysis, the upper bound of the induced-    norm of the FTC system represents worst-case performance
during the detection time interval of FDI modules. The upper bound is calculated as a function of the detection
time interval and exponential decay rates over each parameter subspace. It indicates performance degradation due to
false identification. The usage of the FTC system analysis is demonstrated via analysis of the FTC HiMAT system.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by National Aeronautics and Space Administration under NASA Contract No.
NAS1-02117.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Belcastro and C. Belcastro, “Application of failure detection, identification, and accommodation methods for improved aircraft safety,”
in Proceedings of American Control Conference. American Automatic Control Council, Evanston, IL, 2001, pp. 2623–2624.
[2] J. Chen, R.J. Patton, and Z. Chen, “An LMI approach to Fault-Tolerant Control of Uncertain System,” in Proceeding of the 1998
International Symposium on Intelligent Control. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, N.J., 1998, pp. 175–180.
[3] S. Ganguli, A. Marcos, and G. Balas, “Reconfigurable LPV Control Design for Boeing 747-100/200 Longitudinal Axis,” in Proceedings
of American Control Conference. Anchorage, AK: American Control Conference Council, Evanston, IL, 2002, pp. 3612–3617.
[4] J.-Y. Shin, N.E. Wu, and C. Belcastro, “Adaptive Linear Parameter Varying Control Synthesis for Actuator Failure,” Journal of Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 27, No. 5, pp.787-794, 2004.
[5] I. Szaszi, A. Marcos, G. Balas, and J. Bokor, “LPV Detection Filter Design for Boeing 747-100/200,” in AIAA Guidance, Navigation and
Control, no. AIAA 2002-4957. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2002.
DRAFT
14
[6] J.-Y. Shin, “Worst-Case Analysis and Linear Parameter-Varying Gain-Scheduled Control of Aerospace Systems,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Aerospace Engineering and Mechanics, University of Minnesota, 2000.
[7] F. Wu, “Control of Linear Parameter Varying Systems,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of California,
Berkeley, 1995.
[8] P. Apkarian and R. Adams, “Advanced Gain-Scheduling Techniques for Uncertain Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Control Systems
Technology, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 21–32, 1998.
[9] J. Hespanha, O. Yakimenko, I. Kaminer, and A. Pascoal, “LPV Systems with Brief Instabilities:Application to Integrated Vision/IMU
Navigation,” in IEEE Proceeding of the Conference on Decision and Control, 2001.
[10] J.-Y. Shin and C. Belcastro, “Analysis of A Fault Tolerant Control System: False Fault Detection Case,” in 5th IFAC Symposium on Fault
Detection, Supervision and Safety of Technical Processes, June 2003.
[11] P. Gahinet, A. Nemirovski, A.J. Laub, and M. Chilai, LMI Control Toolbox User’s Guide. Natick, Mass: The MATH Works, 1995.
[12] J.K. Keller and M. Darouach, “Optimal two-stage Kalman filter in the presence of random bias,” Automatica, vol. 33, no. 9, pp. 1745–1748,
1997.
DRAFT
15
cmd
u y
y
LogicFDI
Fault parameter signal
Aero vehicle
FTC
Fig. 1. Structure of a fault tolerant control system.
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Fig. 2. Variations of   due to false identification time (   ) changes.
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Fig. 3. Simulation results with different false identification time values: 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.8 	 .
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